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I. Introduction
“Whatever, in the course of my practice, I may see or hear 
(even when not invited), whatever I may happen to obtain 
knowledge of, if it be not proper to repeat it, I will keep sa-
cred and secret within my own breast” [1]. Trust is one of the 
pillars of physician-patient interaction. For every patient to 
feel comfortable providing the exact and full details required 
for the medical care, he or she must trust the healthcare sys-
tem’s ability to keep this information confidential and must 
trust that it will be used only for the benefit of the patient [2]. 
With the widening adoption of Electronic Medical Records 
(EMRs) throughout healthcare organizations [3-5], patient 
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information finds its way far beyond the original situation in 
which it was revealed. The ease of access to information such 
computerized systems provide is a two-edged sword. The 
same mechanisms that enable healthcare providers to easily 
access any required piece of information with ease, can also 
be exploited for unjustified access competitors and insiders 
alike [5]. 
 EMRs store extensive and highly sensitive information 
about patients, including personal, demographic, and fi-
nancial information, making it a valuable target for attacks 
for various goals [5-7]. In addition to storage of personally-
confidential information, healthcare organizations rely on 
computerized systems for a vast array of functions from 
setting appointments to critical life-supporting devices [8]. 
An attack on such computer systems can lead to extensive 
damage, from breaching the privacy of patients to disruption 
of healthcare operations and direct injury to patients. 
 The confidentiality of the patient’s information is legally 
protected. In the United States, Title Two of the ‘Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’ (HIPAA) 
and subtitle D of the ‘Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act’ impose requirements 
on healthcare organizations regarding the confidentiality of 
patients’ information [9]. The legal basis of privacy require-
ments in Israel is the ‘Privacy Protection Act’ of 1981, which 
deals with sensitive personal information in general [10]. 
The Ministry of Health’s Circular (MoHC) 18/12 from 2012 
and the MoHC 3/15 from 2015 adapt the Privacy Protection 
Act’s requirements to the healthcare setting. It relies on the 
27799 ISO standard and requires the implementation of this 
standard [10,11]. 
 In particular, organizations are required to predict and to 
ameliorate possible security risks through risk analysis and 
consequential risk management. The actual implementation 
of a security policy must be enforced by sanctions on work-
ers violating their predefined permissions and rules. Fol-
lowing the general principle of limiting the exposure of pro-
tected health information (PHI) to the minimum necessary, 
the above-mentioned regulations require a clear definition 
of each worker’s role and access privileges. This means that 
there is a need to authenticate the identity of each worker, 
control his/her access to relevant data, and audit any editing 
of data, including accesses for retrieval only, of PHI [9-11].
 Based on reports from the last 6 years, the confidentiality 
of 135 million electronic patient records were breached in 
the United States alone [12]. While such events may evoke 
the image of sophisticated computer experts cracking the 
computer systems, many of these breaches were the results 
of organizations’ own actions: losing a hard drive containing 
PHI in the Kaiser Permanente Anaheim [13]; accidental at-
tachment of a confidential file to a 200-recipient email in the 
DENT Neurologic Institute [14], and deliberate revelation of 
confidential information by a former employee who manual-
ly photographed personal information in a Florida Digestive 
Health Specialists center [15]. These incidents demonstrate 
that, despite their sophistication, the security of such digital 
systems is still vulnerable to human actions, both innocent 
errors and malicious acts.
 As demonstrated by these security incidents, the success of 
any regulation or technical security mechanism eventually 
depends on the actions of an organization’s personnel and 
their cooperation. The inherent trade-off between the securi-
ty and usability of a system may drive users to break security 
regulations and circumvent security measures in an honest 
attempt to fulfill their duties [5]. 
 Apart from the large-scale mistakes and malicious acts de-
scribed above, one of the most common breaches of PHI is 
the use of another’s credentials to access patient information, 
i.e., the use of the EMR password of one medical staff mem-
ber by another. As explained before, this kind of act is both 
unethical and dangerous. However, the extent of this practice 
has not been previously assessed. We have tried to determine 
the scale of this violation by conducting an Internet-based, 
open survey to assess the prevalence of access credentials 
(AC) sharing among medical and para-medical staff mem-
bers. 
II. Methods
1. Participants
We conducted a four-question Google Forms-based survey 
of medical and para-medical personal. We distributed the 
survey questionnaire to healthcare personnel we work with. 
In addition, we administered the survey through Facebook 
to members of groups that host discussions among medical 
and paramedical personnel. The survey was published on 
Facebook between January 8, 2014 to January 4, 2015, and 
it was open to responses from January 8, 2014 to January 5, 
2015. 
 Based on the number of people who were directly emailed 
the link for the survey and the number of people who were 
exposed to it on their Facebook walls, the number of medi-
cal and paramedical personnel exposed to the survey was 
estimated to be about 2,500 people. Of those, a total of 300 
pressed the link to start the survey, and 299 responded to the 
first question. 
178 www.e-hir.org
Ayal Hassidim et al
https://doi.org/10.4258/hir.2017.23.3.176
2. Measures
Since a direct question such as "Have you ever shared your 
AC with another staff member?" may suggest guilt and there-
fore lead to lower compliance rates and a recall bias, a less 
intimidating style was preferred, such as "Has anyone ever 
shared his/her AC with you?" 
 The survey was conducted in Hebrew, and was based on 
closed questions. A full translation of the survey question-
naire in English is shown in Figure 1, and it can be accessed 
online [16].
 This study was granted an Institutional Review Board waiv-
er by the Israeli Defense Force IRB, as no clinical personal 
subject data were collected or used.
 Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS ver. 20 (IBM, 
Armonk, NY, USA).
III. Results
The main study objective was to determine the prevalence of 
AC sharing. Out of all the potential participants, 300 started 
the survey, 299 answered the first question, and they became 
the study cohort. Of these, 220 participants (73.6%) an-
swered that they have been given the AC of at least one other 
medical or para-medical staff member. When asked how 
many ACs they had been given, only 171 (57.2%) responded 
with an average answer of 4.75 (min = 1, max = 25) ACs 
given to each user, for a total of 814 AC. Forty-nine (16.4%) 
people answered that they had been given the AC of another 
user but did not specify how many times. Thus, the main 
aim of the study was achieved. Other analysis was done to 
try and understand the reasons for this prevalence.
 According to their opinions, when they were asked why 
they had been given the ACs of others and what their role 
was when they received them, their answers were divided as 
shown in Figures 2 and 3.
Health information security survey
We would like to learn about the suitability of the permissions given to medical personnel to their
actual practice requirements. We will be grateful if you could contribute several moments to answer
this questionnaire.
The survey is completely anonymous and the answers will be used solely for research purposes
1. Have you ever been given the authentication (log-in) credentials (e.g. username, password,
magnetic card etc.) to the computer account of another worker
Yes / No
2. To how many accounts have you received log-in credentials?
If the exact umber is unknown, please enter an estimate:
Why did you need the credentials for another worker's account?
a. The worker wanted to perform actions while away
b. Technical malfunction preventing me from using my own account
c. A limitation of the computer system forcing me to use the other worker's account in order
to fulfill my duties
d. I was not given a user account despite having to use the system in order to fulfill my duties
e. The permissions granted to me did not allow me to fulfill my duties
f. Other:
3. What was your job title at the times of these incidents (or lack-thereof)?
More than one question are applicable
a. Student
b. Intern (PGY-1)
c. Resident\registrar
d. Non-consultant physician
e. Nursing staff
f. Consultant (senior) physician
g. Junior administrative staff
h. Senior administrative staff
i. Paramedic\emergency medical technician
j. Para-medical staff
k. Dentist
l. Dental technician
m. Combat medic
n
Figure 1.  The complete, translated 
survey.
Figure 2.  The percentage of participants that were given an ac-
cess credentials (AC) out of the total number of par-
ticipants with the same profession.
Participants that got AC
Total number of participants within the profession
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 An analysis of the reasons why participants needed the ACs 
of other staff members and the subgroups of diverse roles 
they held when they were given the ACs of other staff mem-
bers was done. The reason "I was not given a user account 
despite having to use the system to fulfill my duties" was sig-
nificantly more common among students than among non-
student (working) staff members (0.77 ± 0.42 and 0.28 ± 
0.45, respectively; t(274) = 9.44, p < 0.000). Similar results were 
found for the reason "The permissions granted to me did not 
allow me to fulfill my duties", comparing students and non-
student staff members (0.56 ± 0.49 vs. 0.25 ± 0.43; t(272) = 5.44, 
p < 0.001).
 When examining the intern group and analyzing the rea-
son "I was not given a user account despite having to use 
the system to fulfill my duties" between the intern subgroup 
versus all other study participants, we found the following 
significant difference: interns (0.83 ± 0.37) and all other 
study participants (0.33 ± 0.47) conditions (t(277) = 9.08, p < 
0.000). When analyzing the reason "The permissions granted 
to me did not allow me to fulfill my duties" between the in-
tern subgroup and all other study participants we found the 
following significant difference: interns (0.69 ± 0.46) and all 
other study participants (0.24 ± 0.42) conditions (t(276) = 8.04, 
p < 0.000).
 On the other hand, when examining the nurses group and 
analyzing the reason "I was not given a user account despite 
having to use the system to fulfill my duties" between the 
nurses subgroup and all other study participants, we found 
the following significant difference: nurses (0.1 ± 0.3) and Ta
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Figure 3.  The number of participants that answered that they 
think they were given an access credentials (AC) for 
each reason.
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all other study participants (0.61 ± 0.49) conditions (t(278) = 
–7.53, p < 0.000). When analyzing the reason "The permis-
sions granted to me did not allow me to fulfill my duties" 
between the nurses subgroup and all other participants, we 
found the following significant difference: nurses (0.15 ± 
0.36) and all other study participants (0.45 ± 0.5) conditions 
(t(277) = –4.38, p < 0.000).
 To counter the potential bias of one participant who ob-
tained a large number of ACs as an intern, but also was given 
one AC as a senior, we decided to analyze the data of those 
who answered that they have been given an AC and who 
marked only one job title in the last question of the survey 
(e.g., student, intern, resident, and so on). We found that 152 
of the recipients had only one profession. Of this cohort, 110 
(72%) had been given at least one AC for a total of 338 AC 
obtained with an average of 4 ACs obtained per recipient. 
Students, interns, and residents (each group by itself) were 
given statistically significantly more ACs than the general 
population (p-values are 0.001, 0.008, and 0.001, respective-
ly); nurses, on the contrary, received statistically significantly 
fewer ACs than the general population (p < 0.001), and se-
nior physicians and the other group showed non-statistically 
significant results. Those results are compatible with the 
results we obtained in our first analysis. The details are pre-
sented in Table 1.
IV. Discussion
Protection of PHI confidentiality is a major concern for 
governments and commercial organizations alike, as dem-
onstrated by laws and standards concerning this subject, 
such as HIPAA and ISO Standard 27799. In contrast to the 
Swiss-cheese safety system model [17], the strength of an 
information security system is determined by the strength of 
the weakest link and not by the strength of the whole system 
[18]. As past events show, even a single breach may render 
an information security system ineffective [14-16].
 Medical staff must provide timely and efficient care while 
maintaining patient confidentiality. This may put medical 
staff members in a conflict between their duty and their ob-
ligation to meet security regulations. This conflict may be 
worsened by several practices. On the one hand, there is a 
frequent turn-over of junior staff between organizations and 
departments, up to every week in Israeli medical schools for 
students in their clinical rotations. On the other hand, the 
registration process is strict and lengthy. This combination 
may lead to a gap between the commencement of actual 
work and the granting of an AC allowing the new employee 
to have access to computerized systems. Furthermore, this 
may force these new employees and students to use other 
employee’s credentials to fulfill their duties, explaining the 
higher frequency of this reason among students and interns.
 Under-staffing, especially during on-call hours, may lead 
to the delegation of administrative tasks to para-medical and 
junior staff (such as interns and students). This creates a de 
facto need for them to be granted privileges that have not 
been granted to them in their original roles, and this could 
explain the higher frequency of the reason ("The permissions 
granted to me did not allow me to fulfill my duties") among 
students and interns for receiving the ACs of other staff 
members.
 Another group of limited clinical privileges, nurses, actu-
ally demonstrated an opposite trend. Nurses reported that 
they were given fewer ACs compared to the general study 
population. Despite the similarity in the limitation of clinical 
privileges, this contrast may be explained by a very funda-
mental difference between the privileges and work of junior 
physicians and nurses. Regulations grant physicians a global 
and general privilege to perform any medical activity; while 
nurses are limited to only those activities specifically ap-
proved to be performed by nurses. This may enable a more 
precise definition of clinical duties, facilitating the matching 
of granted EMR privileges to the defined duties. Moreover, 
in unplanned clinical scenarios, the limited list of nurses' 
clinical privileges may prohibit them from performing the 
action in question and spares them the conflict between pro-
viding necessary care and following regulations. Nurses gen-
erally work under the guidance of a more privileged clinician 
(e.g., a physician) to whom they may transfer a duty outside 
of their permitted scope. A physician, as the clinical practi-
tioner in charge, may be left with no option but to transfer 
an unplanned duty. This situation can become more relevant 
during on-call hours when interns and residents may be 
encountered with unexpected duties that require them to 
manipulate the use of EMR ACs to complete their tasks. 
 In the face of such security breaches, organizations may be 
tempted to strengthen the authentication process, for exam-
ple, by requiring smart-cards and biometric authentication 
(multi-factor authentication). While having their merits, 
these measures can actually worsen the situation and drive 
users to further violate security regulations: physical tokens 
may be left for other users just like passwords, and biomet-
ric authentication may drive the users to completely avoid 
the electronic system and rely on paper forms, which could 
make EMR systems redundant. This may lead to deteriora-
tion of treatment because, when paper forms are used in an 
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EMR-based environment, data can be lost or misplaced, and 
this can create risks for patients. 
 Our results show that current permission granting and au-
thentication processes might cause more harm than good. In 
an attempt to achieve better security, usability is hindered to 
the level the users feel that the right thing to do is to violate 
the security regulations altogether. While the ISO standard 
on information security (ISO/IEC 27700) bases information 
security on the three principles of confidentiality, integrity 
and availability [19], it may be beneficial to keep in mind 
a fourth principle, usability, which is essential for end-user 
compliance and cooperation. Accordingly, when deciding on 
the privileges and authentication of users, an organization 
first has to take into consideration its own expectations from 
its employees and the level of flexibility and discretion each 
user needs and can handle.
 As has been shown previously [20], reduction of ethical 
standards is a contagious behavior. As medical personnel, we 
know that sharing PHI is part of medical treatment, mainly 
when consultant help is required. We are afraid that, while 
residents share both legitimate information to give the best 
care to their patients and their ACs to fulfill their duties, 
there is an increased chance that they will feel free to share 
more information about their patients that is not simply re-
lated to their medical treatment [21].
 The current survey was conducted using an anonymous, 
on-line platform. This administration method is advanta-
geous to foster a sense of anonymity in responders, which 
allows them to reveal information that might otherwise be 
left concealed. The mere action of transferring an AC is con-
sidered a violation of security regulations, sometimes to the 
level of a felony. Any organization inquiring into such inci-
dents may find itself legally liable for the actions of its em-
ployees. The employees themselves, on the other hand, may 
find themselves liable for either the incident itself or for the 
failure to report it, a violation on its own. However, as it was 
an anonymous survey, we were unable to link the reported 
reasons for AC breach to responders’ professional phase, 
thus possibly mixing reasons relevant to different phases. 
 There were several limitations to this study. A question 
arises about the efficacy of an online questionnaire as a sci-
entific tool. This question has been discussed by others, and 
the questionnaires considered were found as good as other, 
more customary, surveys [22]. The current participants were 
Hebrew-speaking medical personal who agreed to answer an 
Internet-based survey and might have had a prior interest in 
PHI, which could limit the generalizability of the findings. 
Another limitation is that the survey did not account for the 
professional stage at which the AC violations occurred. For 
instance, a senior physician may have answered that he/she 
was given an AC, but this may have happened when he/she 
was an intern, when there was less awareness of the impor-
tance of PHI.
 The current findings emphasize that increased awareness 
of this issue is needed to improve EMR systems and the 
security of PHI. To our knowledge this is the first time ques-
tions like this were assessed in an academic manner, and the 
results support the hypothesis that AC sharing is a common 
practice in the medical world. 
 We call for two main recommendations. First, usability 
should be added as the fourth principal in planning EMRs 
and other PHI-containing medical records. Second, an addi-
tional option should be included for each EMR role that will 
grant it maximal privileges for one action. When this op-
tion is invoked, the senior physician/the PHI security officer 
would be informed. This would allow junior staff to perform 
urgent, lifesaving, decisions, without outwitting the EMR, 
and under formal retrospective supervision by the senior 
members in charge. 
 The next phase of this research will be a survey of medical 
staff when several declarations will be evaluated by the sur-
vey recipients (such as "I am not allowed to share my AC." - 
right/wrong). Then, episodes that describe AC sharing will 
be introduced to the survey recipients, and they will need to 
say whether AC sharing was the "right" thing to do in those 
scenarios. After that, they will have an open space to express 
other options to overcome the problem that was illustrated 
by each scenario. This should show the ambivalence that 
we all share as medical staff—we know we should not share 
ACs, but we still do so. 
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